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Operationalizing Internal Administrative Law
CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER & REBECCA TURNBULL†
As part of the Hastings Law Journal’s Administrative Law in the Age of Trump Symposium, this
Essay argues that administrative law should stop fixating on federal courts. While court-centric
external administrative law serves an important role in administrative practice, it is far from
sufficient to safeguard against agency overreach. After all, the vast majority of agency actions
never make it to court. Instead, this Essay builds on recent suggestions that federal agencies can
leverage internal administrative law to self-discipline against abuses of power. By surveying
internal administrative law in various regulatory contexts and drawing substantially from the
important work of the Administrative Conference of the United States, this Essay seeks to
operationalize the concept of internal administrative law to demonstrate its critical and attainable
safeguarding role for agency actions that often escape judicial review.

† John W. Bricker Professor of Law and J.D. Candidate 2021, respectively, The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law. This Essay is based on Professor Walker’s remarks at the Hastings Law Journal’s 2020
Symposium—Revolution or Evolution: Administrative Law in the Age of Trump. For helpful comments, thanks
are due to Reeve Bull, Ming Hsu Chen, Aaron Nielson, Zach Price, Dorit Reiss, and Matt Wiener.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative practice is an iceberg.1 Federal courts see only the tip
peaking above the water—the judicial challenges to regulatory actions that make
it to the courthouse. Administrative law scholars have dedicated much time to
analyzing that small peak of judicial review of agency action and related judicial
deference doctrines.2 Yet, below the water’s surface exists a mass of regulatory
activity that escapes the judiciary’s purview. That activity either evades judicial
review entirely or is substantially insulated from review. Accordingly, as one of
us has cautioned, “[i]t is a mistake for administrative law to fixate on judicial
review as the core safeguard for our constitutional republic.”3
The breadth and variety of administrative action that escapes judicial
review is staggering. Indeed, almost all categories of agency action enjoy some
insulation from judicial oversight.4 For example, despite the availability of
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), notice-andcomment rulemaking is subject to significant judicial deference per the Chevron
doctrine, generally as long as the agency’s final rule represents a “reasonable”
interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers.5 Moreover,
because agencies play an important role in drafting the statutes that govern them,
that judicially insulated Chevron policy space is—at least to some degree—selfdelegated.6 Less-formal subregulatory activities are further insulated from
judicial review. In particular, agency guidance itself is not legally binding and
therefore not generally reviewable, though it may arise in litigation as it reflects
an agency’s interpretation of the underlying statute or regulation it is enforcing
(and may, in the latter case, receive Auer deference, as narrowed by Kisor).7 And
1. We borrow this analogy from Nicholas Parrillo’s study of agency guidance and expand it to depict
internal administrative law as a whole, which encompasses at least some types of agency guidance. Nicholas R.
Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 165, 170 (2019) (“But litigation is only the tip of the iceberg. The iceberg itself is administrative
practice: the workaday world of agency officials and their attorneys who must constantly decide how to
formulate and use guidance documents that are officially supposed to be nonbinding.” (footnote omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and
Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014) (observing how, with nearly 70,000 citations, Chevron
U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is one of the most-cited administrative law decisions of
all time).
3. Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1638 (2018).
4. For a more detailed discussion of the following examples, see id. at 1625–38; see infra Part II for
further analysis.
5. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984); see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018)
(detailing notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures); id. § 702 (providing for judicial review of final agency
action).
6. See Christopher J. Walker, Lawmaking Within Federal Agencies and Without Judicial Review, 32 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 551, 553–59 (2017) (exploring how agency policymaking is insulated from judicial
review both by Chevron deference and agency statutory drafting practices). The administrative state’s budgeting
process is also largely shielded from judicial review. See Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source
of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2186 (2016).
7. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 266–
69 (2018). For a discussion of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019),
see infra note 90 and accompanying text.
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regulated entities often face great incentives to comply with agency guidance
and forgo judicial review even when they have avenues to challenge such
guidance in court.8
Despite the availability of judicial review under the APA, most agency
adjudications escape federal court supervision. Formal adjudication—and mass
agency adjudication in particular—creates great disparities in adjudicative
outcomes that go uncorrected by courts because adjudicated individuals often
lack the resources or knowledge to seek review.9 Informal adjudication receives
even less attention from courts because of its lack of evidentiary hearing
requirements and, in some cases, statutory limits on judicial review.10
Enforcement actions themselves are subject to judicial review, but
administrative decisions whether to enforce generally are not. That discretion
includes both decisions not to enforce11 as well as decisions to “crack down,” as
Mila Sohoni puts it.12
Appreciating this phenomenon of bureaucracy beyond judicial review
should encourage us to rethink theories and doctrines in administrative law, and
to reconsider the direction of administrative law as a field. So much scholarly
attention has focused on refining judicial deference doctrines and standards of
review to strike the right balance of allowing agencies to reasonably exercise
their expertise, while reining in arbitrary exercises of agency discretion.13
However, if judicial review provides no safeguard against potential abuses of
power in most regulatory activities, we must turn to other mechanisms to protect
liberty and the rule of law. All three branches of the federal government must
play their roles. As should civil society and the agencies themselves.
This Essay calls attention to one such critical safeguard that merits further
scholarly inquiry: internal administrative law. As Gillian Metzger and Kevin
8. See Parrillo, supra note 1, at 184–230 (documenting and assessing the strength of these compliance
incentives).
9. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015); David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1177, 1191–97 (2016). In this Essay, we include within the “formal adjudication” category any agency
adjudication where a hearing is required by statute or regulation, with all other agency adjudications falling
within the “informal” categorization. In the new world of agency adjudication, that means we are combining
“Type A” and “Type B” adjudication as formal and “Type C” as informal. See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa
F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 153–57 (2019) (discussing the
Type A, B, and C categorizations of agency adjudication embraced by the Administrative Conference of the
United States in Adoption of Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,314–15 (Dec. 23, 2016)).
10. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
183–84, 201–07 (2017).
11. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (“[T]he presumption that agency decisions not
to institute [enforcement] proceedings are unreviewable. . . .”).
12. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 33 (2017).
13. We do not mean to overclaim. Many administrative law scholars have followed in the footsteps of Jerry
Mashaw, who dedicated his career to examining administrative law and regulatory practice from inside the
administrative state. Such examples are set forth in a recent edited volume that honors and builds on his
pioneering work. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY
L. MASHAW (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017). Yet, unfortunately, the field of administrative law as a whole is
still too court-centric.
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Stack explain in their seminal article on the subject, “[i]nternal administrative
law consists of the internal directives, guidance, and organizational forms
through which agencies structure the discretion of their employees and
presidents control the workings of the executive branch.”14 Thus, the world of
internal administrative law is vast. Yet, it mostly escapes judicial review.
Returning to the image of the iceberg, internal administrative law operates
almost entirely below the surface. This is because internal administrative law is,
well, internal. Yet internal law influences the everyday decisions agencies make.
And these decisions matter because they collectively add up to the various ways
agencies impose additional procedures on themselves beyond the bare minimum
required by the APA and the agencies’ organic statutes—Vermont Yankee’s
“white space,” as Emily Bremer and Sharon Jacobs so aptly describe this area
of internal law.15
It turns out that internal administrative law has the potential to serve as a
potent defense against agency overreach. Yet, as Bremer and Jacobs observe,
“[o]ne major downside of the dearth of judicial oversight in this area [of internal
administrative law] . . . is that procedural innovation has received limited
scholarly attention.”16 This Essay seeks to help remedy that deficiency by
attempting to operationalize the concept of internal administrative law to
demonstrate its critical safeguarding role with respect to agency actions that
often escape judicial review.
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. Part I seeks to define internal
administrative law to situate its place in the modern regulatory state, including
the critical role of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
in identifying, cultivating, and encouraging best practices in internal
administrative law across all federal agencies. Part II shifts to apply internal
administrative law in areas where agency actions are insulated from judicial
review. To be sure, we do not endeavor to present a comprehensive account.
Instead, we offer some concrete examples, many drawn from ACUS
recommendations, on how internal administrative law can serve as a critical
bulwark against potential abuses of administrative power. The Essay concludes
by underscoring that internal administrative law is a necessary but not sufficient
defense and calling for a more-sustained scholarly inquiry into its role and
effectiveness in constraining agency overreach—especially such overreach that
may occur when judicial oversight is absent.

14. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1239
(2017).
15. Emily S. Bremer & Sharon B. Jacobs, Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee’s White Space, 32 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 523, 523–24 (2017) (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978), and defining this “white space” as “the scope of agency discretion to experiment with
procedures within the boundaries established by law (and thus beyond the reach of the courts)”).
16. Id. at 542.
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DEFINING INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Internal administrative law is not a new concept.17 Nonetheless, it remains
a neglected one. This may be, as Bremer and Jacobs suggest, because of the lack
of judicial oversight and, consequently, the lack of scholarly attention that such
judicial activity attracts.18 Or, as Metzger and Stack hypothesize, it may be due
to a deeply ingrained distrust of administrative governance in the United
States.19 Such distrust may stem from constitutional concerns of unchecked
bureaucratic power, especially as Congress delegates more power to federal
agencies and courts are instructed to defer to those administrative actions. For
example, Justice Scalia ominously described the combined growth of legislative
delegation and judicial deference to agencies as a “dangerous permission slip for
the arrogation of power” beyond constitutional boundaries.20 Chief Justice
Roberts has echoed this theme of bureaucratic distrust:
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern themselves, through
their elected leaders. The growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast
power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it
may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.21

Regardless of the cause for ignoring internal administrative law, we agree
that “[t]he reigning model for administrative law doctrine continues to be
external constraints on agencies imposed by Congress and the courts.”22 This
Part looks inward to trace the modern origins and evolution of internal
administrative law. By design, our discussion is cursory, as Metzger and Stack
have already given the definitive account of internal administrative law from the
APA’s enactment up to today.23 Our modest objective is to further define the
function of internal administrative law in the modern regulatory state and,
importantly, to underscore ACUS’s central role in its ongoing development.
17. See, e.g., BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS
§ 4, at 14 (Lawbook Exchange 2014) (1903) (discussing the differences between “internal
administrative law” and the external law of administration, and arguing that the former is the “real subject” of
administrative law inquiry).
18. Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 15, at 542.
19. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1305–06 (“[T]he anti-administration meme has deep roots in
American political culture, and . . . retains political salience.” (footnote omitted)); accord Gillian E. Metzger,
The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2017); cf. Aaron L. Nielson, Response, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist”, 131 HARV. L.
REV. F. 1, 10 (2017) (offering a critique of Metzger’s stance, yet agreeing with her that the Supreme Court’s
“strong rhetoric has not been paired with equally strong decisions”).
20. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Center, 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
21. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010); see also City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Framers could hardly have
envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold
over our economic, social, and political activities” (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 499)).
22. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1243–44; accord Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 15, at 541–42.
23. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1266–78 (exploring the role of internal administrative law
during the enactment of the APA in 1946); id. at 1278–90 (analyzing the post-APA development of internal
law).
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
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A.

THE ORIGIN STORY
The concept of internal administrative law is unsurprisingly broad. It has
been succinctly defined as “measures governing agency functioning that are
created within the agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to
government personnel.”24 The term encompasses far more than just internal
procedures, as Metzger and Stack explain:
Internal administrative law thus includes internal procedures for agency
action, structures of internal agency organization and allocation of authority,
specifications for how agency actors are to make evaluations or conduct analysis,
guidance about the agency’s understanding of what statutes and regulations mean,
informal agency practices, interagency agreements and norms, and centrally
generated cross-cutting requirements for agency action.25

Despite the diverse measures that constitute internal administrative law, all of
them share the fundamental characteristic of being implemented from inside of
agencies to control their actions and operations.26
Furthermore, we concur with Metzger and Stack that the concept of
internal administrative law fits squarely within the scheme contemplated by the
APA.27 The APA was enacted in 1946 to codify the default rules for agency
action and judicial review thereof.28 The general consensus today is that the
drafters of the APA intentionally left space within the default rules for agencies
to add details as needed in the form of their internal laws.29 In other words, the
internal laws were intended to be the living flesh on the APA’s skeleton.30 This
statutory design is evidenced in at least two ways. First, the drafters imposed
one simple limitation on certain types of agencies’ internal laws by requiring
their publication in the Federal Register.31 Second, the APA expressly exempts
internal administrative law from the notice-and-comment requirements of
rulemaking. All internal rules relating to agency management and personnel,
“interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency

24. Id. at 1251.
25. Id. at 1256. Assessing whether internal administrative law qualifies as authoritative “law,” as opposed
to administration or bureaucracy, exceeds the ambitions of this Essay. For a thorough treatment of the subject,
see id. at 1256–63.
26. Id. at 1254 (“Yet all of these measures share the key characteristics of internal administrative law: they
are measures generated by agencies to control their own actions and operations and aimed primarily at agency
personnel.”).
27. See id. at 1266–78 (reviewing the legislative history and statutory structure of the APA).
28. Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 633
(2017).
29. Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 15, at 533 (“[C]ourts and scholars have increasingly understood the
APA . . . as [providing] a skeletal framework that leaves substantial latitude for agency procedural innovation.”).
30. See id. Federal agencies’ internal administrative law can also be constrained by the Constitution, the
agencies’ respective organic statutes, judicial precedent, and presidential directives. See id. at 531–37 (noting
these constraints beyond the APA); see also Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1286–88, 1297–1301 (detailing
the role of executive branch regulation of internal administrative law).
31. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 236–37 (1946); see also Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1276–77
(describing the requirement in greater detail).
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organization, procedure, or practice,” are expressly exempted.32 As the APA
drafters themselves acknowledged, the need to “encourage the making of such
rules” for various internal agency processes is critical to controlling and
directing agency power beyond its statutory constraints.33
B. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
As surveyed in Part II, federal agencies have taken advantage of the APA’s
generous grant of flexibility to develop internal procedures and practices. Yet at
least two other actors have played a critical, though perhaps unexpected, role in
the evolution of internal administrative law: federal courts and the President.34
Each will be discussed in turn.
1. From the Outside: Federal Courts
Although traditionally viewed as expositors and umpires of external
administrative law, federal courts have also influenced the evolution of internal
administrative law in at least three ways.35
First, federal courts have developed judicial reviewability doctrines for
internal administrative law. The APA prohibits judicial review of agency action
that has been “committed to agency discretion by law.”36 And the APA itself is
a law that commits rules developed as part of internal administrative law to
agency discretion without notice-and-comment constraints. 37 Yet, courts have
interpreted the APA to provide for judicial review of internal administrative law
when there is “law to apply.”38 As Metzger and Stack summarize these
32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).
33. S. REP. NO. 79-248, at 18 (1946).
34. There are, of course, other key actors that shape internal administrative law. ACUS, for example, will
be further discussed in Part I.C and Part II. But a few more come immediately to mind that this Essay will not
discuss in detail: the Justice Department; Article I congressional agencies such as the Government
Accountability Office; and the American Bar Association (ABA) and in particular its Section on Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice, which regularly advises Congress, federal agencies, and courts on the proper
development of internal and external administrative law. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Kovacs, Scalia’s Bargain, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1163–1170 (2016) (detailing the role of the Justice Department, ABA, and ACUS in the
enactment of the 1976 amendment to the APA); Walker, supra note 28, at 638–48 (describing the roles of ACUS
and the ABA in assessing potential reforms to the APA). As a matter of full disclosure, one of us (Walker) serves
as a Public Member of ACUS and as Chair-Elect of the ABA’s Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice.
35. See generally Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1281–86 (discussing the first two ways); Bremer &
Jacobs, supra note 15, at 535–36 (discussing the third).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2018).
37. Id. § 553(a)(2) (excepting from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement any proposed rules
involving “a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts”).
38. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599–600 (1988) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)); see, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834–35 (1985) (explaining that agency
guidance is reviewable if the law “indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has
provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion”). See generally Ronald M. Levin,
Understanding Unreviewablity in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 705–09 (1990) (discussing the
flaws of the Court’s “law to apply” test in Overton Park).
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developments, “to the extent an agency’s internal pronouncements appear to do
the work of internal law—to establish norms that bind agency actors, or confine,
structure, and constrain the agency’s discretion—they risk creating grounds for
external judicial review of the agency’s compliance.”39 As the Introduction
reveals, we are inclined to view opportunities for judicial review to be a feature,
not a flaw—at least more so than Metzger and Stack.40 But we agree that these
reviewability doctrines may have the unintended and detrimental consequence
of discouraging federal agencies from developing clear and constraining internal
administrative law—out of fear that sophisticated regulated entities would have
one more tool to utilize to obtain judicial invalidation of agency actions.41
Second, and related, the Supreme Court has recognized an external check
on internal administrative law in the form of the Accardi principle: “[a]gencies
must comply with their own regulations.”42 As originally understood, the
Accardi principle only applied to agency procedures promulgated in rules
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other words, if federal agencies
wanted to make internal procedural rules “stickier,” they could choose to expend
more time and resources to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.43 But
as Metzger and Stack explain, “[t]he Supreme Court has sent mixed signals
about the scope of Accardi’s application to internal law.”44 If Accardi applies
even to procedures promulgated through rules exempt from the APA’s noticeand-comment process or subregulatory guidance, federal agencies may well face
incentives not to develop internal law at all. Indeed, despite sending mixed
messages, the Court has wisely recognized that “it is far better to have [purely
internal procedural] rules . . . and to tolerate occasional erroneous
administration . . . , than either to have no rules except those mandated by
statute, or to have them framed in a mere precatory form.”45
Third, courts have developed a variety of “administrative common law”
doctrines that graft onto the APA additional procedures for agencies to follow
as well as extra-textual standards for judicial review.46 As Kenneth Culp Davis
39. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1283.
40. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Against Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 106 (2017).
41. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1295 (“[T]hat doctrinal move creates the wrong incentives for
agencies when it comes to developing and refining their internal law.”).
42. Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006) (citing United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)).
43. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 874
(2009) (“From the perspective of permitting an agency to credibly commit to future action, the most important
feature of [the Accardi] doctrine is that its enforcement is not up to the agency, but is rather up to the courts.”).
In his contribution to this Symposium, Aaron Nielson explores another aspect of making agency actions
“stickier.” Aaron Nielson, Sticky Regulations and Restoring Internet Freedom, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1209 (2020)
44. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1284.
45. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 756 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1295 (2012) (defending and defining administrative common law as “administrative law doctrines and
requirements that are largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the President, or
individual agencies”). But see John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
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famously put it, “[m]ost administrative law is judge-made law, and most judgemade administrative law is administrative common law.”47 While administrative
common law remains commonplace, the Court has sought to strike down judicial
efforts to impose additional procedures on agencies that are not required by
statute. Most famously, the Vermont Yankee Court held that “[a]gencies are free
to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but
reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not
chosen to grant them.”48 More recently, the Court rejected another
administrative common law doctrine—the requirement of notice-and-comment
rulemaking to reverse certain prior agency guidance—and held that such
doctrine “improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum
procedural requirements’ specified in the APA.”49
In sum, the Supreme Court has recognized the Vermont Yankee “white
space” for internal administrative law as well as agencies’ flexibility to create
external judicial checks on internal administrative law by entrenching that
internal law in legislative rules. These are good developments for internal
administrative law. But federal courts have also impeded the healthy growth of
internal law by providing unclear guidance on when such internal law is
judicially reviewable and judicially enforceable as binding on the agency.
2.

From the Inside: The President

Perhaps in ways not fully contemplated by the APA, the President has
played an important role in the development of internal administrative law. The
President, through White House offices like the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
exercises some control over agency internal law in the form of executive orders,
memoranda, bulletins, and circulars that generally apply to the entire executive
branch.50 One of the most important presidential directives to date for controlling
internal law is President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,866, which builds on
President Reagan’s Executive Order No. 12,291 and sets out a detailed system
for centralized regulatory review that constrains executive agencies’ flexibility
to develop their own rulemaking procedures.51 This centralized review system
113, 152 (1998) (criticizing some administrative common law); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and
Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1209 (2015) (similar).
47. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L.
REV. 3, 3 (1980).
48. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
49. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 100 (2015) (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524);
see also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Pixelating Administrative Common Law in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
125 YALE L.J. F. 31, 42 (2015) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n for
not “explain[ing] why Paralyzed Veterans doctrine conflicts with the APA”).
50. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1255–56.
51. See id. at 1286, 1297–1301 (raising concerns about OIRA’s role in internal administrative law because
of, among other things, the lack of transparency). See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2285–90 (2001) (discussing further Executive Order No. 12,866 and other means the
President has to control the modern administrative state).
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requires agencies to submit certain rules to OIRA for review, undertake costbenefit analysis of certain rules, and develop a regulatory agenda for
OMB/OIRA approval, among numerous other requirements.52
Presidential administrations are increasingly relying on executive orders
and other presidential directives to assert more control over the process and
content of regulatory activities.53 The Trump Administration, for instance, has
issued executive orders to impose regulatory budgeting on executive agencies,
to influence how they handle adjudicative and enforcement actions, and to
constrain how they issue and handle guidance.54 To be sure, we think it is fair to
categorize these presidential actions as a form of internal administrative law.
Unlike agency-specific internal law, presidentially created internal law typically
applies across the board to all (executive) agencies, thus potentially intruding on
agency-specific innovations in internal law.55 Yet, the internal nature of these
presidential directives effectively shields them from the same legislative and
judicial review to which enacted laws and final rules are subject.56
C.

THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

While the roles of federal courts and the President have been well covered
in the literature on internal administrative law, generally missing from the
conventional account is the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS). That is unfortunate, as ACUS plays a significant role in developing
internal administrative law today and thus in protecting against agency
overreach for regulatory actions that escape judicial review.
Soon after the APA was enacted, government officials, scholars, and
practitioners collectively recognized the need for an independent federal agency
to support and improve administrative procedure.57 That agency was eventually

52. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2018).
53. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1297.
54. Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2018);
Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and
Adjudication, Exec. Order No. 13,892, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,239 (Oct. 15, 2019); Promoting the Rule of Law Through
Improved Agency Guidance Documents, Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 15, 2019).
55. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1301; see also Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the
Missing Interpretive Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing the inter-agency coordination
involved in the drafting of executive orders).
56. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1286–87; see also Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib,
Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 261–63 (2015) (observing that “OIRA’s work of
centralized regulatory review is rarely understood to be jurisgenerative, in part because its role in the Executive
Branch is not subject to direct judicial review,” but arguing that it is internal administrative law—
“regleprudence”—that raises “immanent concerns of legality that ought to structure administrative action even
in the absence of that judicial oversight”).
57. Antonin Scalia & Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Administrative Conference, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2015) (testimony of Antonin Scalia); see also Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, James Landis
and the Dilemmas of Administrative Government, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1330 (2015) (exploring the influence
of James Landis on the creation of ACUS). For a brief account of ACUS’s history, see David M. Pritzker, A
Brief History of the Administrative Conference, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1708 (2015); see also id. at 1732–1817
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brought to life in 1964 with the statutory creation of ACUS, which opened its
doors in 1968.58 ACUS brings together government officials, administrative law
scholars, and regulatory lawyers to study and recommend improvements to the
administrative process.59 Thus, ACUS is vested with a unique “convening
power” that allows federal agency officials and outside experts to communicate
with one another beyond traditional bureaucratic channels to ensure the effective
operation of administrative law.60 Its collaborative work results in
recommendations of best practices that agencies may choose to adopt.61 Perhaps
in part because agencies are substantially involved in those collaborative efforts,
many of them eventually do adopt the recommended practices.62
ACUS places particular emphasis on studying and encouraging the
development of internal administrative law.63 As Metzger observes, internal
processes are ACUS’s “dominant concerns.”64 This is due to its recognition that
the ability of agencies to self-impose internal procedures is a foundation on
which the APA relies.65 In other words, agencies need to be able to
independently self-regulate beyond the APA’s default rules to carry out
administrative law “expeditiously in the public interest.”66 ACUS operates as
the means to that end.67 As noted above, ACUS makes recommendations to
improve internal (and external) administrative law, but agencies do not have to
comply with its recommendations. It has no statutory power to bind. Some
agencies choose not to comply, or otherwise depart from ACUS
recommendations by adapting them based on agency-specific considerations.
Agencies may opt out if compliance would risk further judicial or executive
intrusion into agency practices. Such agency noncompliance has spurred some
(presenting bibliography of ACUS publications); id. at 1818–22 (listing articles written about ACUS); id. at
1823–33 (listing ACUS recommendations and statements).
58. Scalia & Breyer, supra note 57 (testimony of Antonin Scalia) (discussing the enactment of the
Administrative Conference Act of 1964).
59. Id. Section 591(1) states that the purpose of the ACUS is:
[T]o provide suitable arrangements through which Federal agencies, assisted by outside experts, may
cooperatively study mutual problems, exchange information, and develop recommendations for action by
proper authorities to the end that private rights may be fully protected and regulatory activities and other
Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously in the public interest.
5 U.S.C. § 591(1) (2018).
60. Paul R. Verkuil, ACUS 2.0: Present at the Recreation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1133, 1135–36 (2015).
61. Id. at 1137; see also Michael Herz, ACUS—and Administrative Law—Then and Now, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1217 (2015) (chronicling ACUS’s influence on administrative law); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Administrative Conference and Empirical Research, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1564, 1564–66 (2015) (exploring
how ACUS’s empirical work has identified best practices and improved internal law).
62. Verkuil, supra note 60, at 1137.
63. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of
the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1537 (2015); see also Funmi E. Olorunnipa, ACUS 2.0:
Bridging the Gap Between Administrative Law and Public Administration, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1555, 1557
(2015) (exploring how ACUS helps bridge the gap between external and internal administrative law).
64. Metzger, supra note 63, at 1538.
65. Id.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 591(1) (2018) (setting forth ACUS’s purpose).
67. See id.
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to argue that Congress should grant ACUS the power to make some
recommendations mandatory.68
Reform is neither necessary nor prudent. Such power may discourage
agencies from engaging fully in ACUS’s collaborative process. It may also risk
ACUS’s existence if the exercise of such power upsets the political branches, as
the agency had already been defunded (for nearly fifteen years) once before.69
More to the point and as illustrated by the examples in Part II, ACUS has been
able to play, and continues to play, a critical role in encouraging valuable
internal administrative law without the power to bind agencies. It is effective
because its substantive recommendations are persuasive, expert driven, and
evidence based; and its decisionmaking process is deliberative, collaborative,
inclusive, and consensus driven. ACUS’s vital role in the development of
internal law merits further study and scholarly attention. Part II seeks to start
that discussion.
II. APPLYING INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Despite our best efforts, the definitional work done in Part I may strike
readers as too abstract and theoretical. This is, unfortunately, inevitable in
discussions about internal administrative law, which encompasses a broad scope
of internal agency procedures, practices, and structures. To help operationalize
internal administrative law as a safeguard against bureaucratic overreach
(especially in a world without judicial review), Part II examines particular
applications of internal administrative law. To do so, we return to the five
categories of agency action flagged in the Introduction—(a) rulemaking,
(b) subregulatory guidance, (c) formal adjudication, (d) informal adjudication,
and (e) enforcement—and the aspects of those actions that escape judicial
review. This is by no means an exhaustive account of the various internal agency
procedures and constraints that could counteract the lack of judicial supervision.
Instead, we provide a few concrete examples for each category of agency action,
with the hope that such examples illustrate how to operationalize internal
administrative law as a potent check on the potential dangers of bureaucracy
beyond judicial review.

68. Verkuil, supra note 60, at 1137 (arguing that ACUS’s inability to demand compliance with its
recommendations “cabins [its] authority,” unlike similar congressional agencies, such as GAO, that have the
authority to require agencies to respond to its reports before Congress).
69. See Susan Jensen, An Informal Legislative History of the Reauthorization of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1410, 1411, 1414 (2015); David C. Vladeck, The
Administrative Conference at Fifty: An Agency Lives Twice, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1689, 1694–97 (2015).
Another scholar has criticized ACUS for shying away from political issues, such as OIRA centralized review.
See Peter L Strauss, The Administrative Conference and the Political Thumb, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1668,
1680–87 (2015). ACUS’s nonideological and politically cautious approach strikes us as more of a virtue than a
vice, especially when it comes to encouraging the development of internal administrative law.
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A.

RULEMAKING
The APA contemplates both formal, trial-like adjudication and informal,
notice-and-comment rulemaking, but today nearly all rulemaking is informal.70
For informal rulemaking, the APA requires agencies to subject proposed rules
to public notice and comment.71 Once agencies publish final rules, they become
subject to judicial review.72 Judicial review, however, is not plenary, as Chevron
deference significantly limits it.73 Specifically, if the underlying statute is
ambiguous, the reviewing court only assesses whether the agency’s
interpretation is “reasonable” and, thus, permissible.74 This deference creates a
Chevron policymaking “space” within which agencies regulate without judicial
interference.75 One survey of agency rule drafters suggests that agencies are
keenly aware of that space in the rulemaking process, and perhaps even leverage
it by proposing more “aggressive” statutory interpretations than they would in a
world without Chevron deference.76
To be sure, we do not mean to suggest that Chevron policymaking space is
necessarily a bad thing. After all, Congress often delegates such policymaking
space to agencies because of their relative substantive expertise, use of publicengaging deliberative processes, and political accountability—at least compared
to their judicial peers.77 But concerns remain that the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process may not fully leverage agency and public expertise, may not
be sufficiently deliberative to fully assess the proposed regulatory action and its
alternatives, and may not reflect the wishes of the people and their elected
representatives.
Not surprisingly, internal administrative law can help address these
concerns. Indeed, ACUS has commissioned a number of studies and made
numerous recommendations to improve the rulemaking process and the public’s

70. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1160–61 (2014).
71. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (detailing applicable notice-and-comment procedures).
72. See id. § 702 (providing for judicial review of final agency action).
73. See Walker, supra note 6, at 553–57.
74. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
75. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Chevron] create[s] a
space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion.”); see also Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is
Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145
(2012). One empirical study of Chevron deference finds a difference of nearly twenty-five percentage points in
agency-win rates when circuit courts apply the Chevron deference framework, as compared to when they refuse
to do so, and finds that, as for Chevron’s policymaking space, once the circuit courts got to Chevron’s second
step, agencies prevailed 93.8 percent of the time. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017).
76. Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM
L. REV. 703, 722–24, 722 fig.3 (2014) (finding that about four in five rule drafters surveyed agreed to some
degree that a federal agency is more “aggressive” in its interpretive efforts if it believes a reviewing court will
apply Chevron deference instead of a less-deferential standard).
77. See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political
Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1475–81 (2018) (exploring the rationales for Chevron deference).
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participation in it.78 As ACUS stated in the preamble of one of its most recent
rulemaking recommendations, “[r]obust public participation is vital to the
rulemaking process” for accountability and legitimacy purposes.79 Thus,
agencies should adopt internal procedures to increase public input in their
rulemaking activities. Among other things, ACUS has recommended that
agencies solicit public comments “as early as feasible” when considering certain
potential rules,80 including targeting and meeting with knowledgeable or
affected parties for feedback.81 Other recent recommendations include
improving online access to rulemaking dockets and related materials, utilizing
social media to improve public engagement and awareness of rulemaking
activities, and drafting rules in plain language for better public comprehension—
just to name a few.82
Each of these recommendations seeks to encourage the APA’s original
public-participation goals for increasing transparency and accountability in the
rulemaking process, not just after publication of the final rule. As such goodgovernance objectives are substantially insulated from judicial review, these
innovations in internal administrative law should also help constrain, legitimate,
and improve the Chevron policymaking space.
B.

SUBREGULATORY GUIDANCE

To assist in regulatory activities, agencies often issue subregulatory
guidance.83 The APA exempts such agency guidance—“general statements of
policy” and “interpretative rules”—from rulemaking’s notice-and-comment
requirements.84 The relaxed requirements are justified by the fact that guidance
is not supposed to be binding on either the agency or the public.85 In other words,
guidance is portrayed as “a mere tentative announcement” of how the agency

78. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina et al., The Problem with Words: Plain Language and Public Participation
in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1358, 1360 (2015) (“Fifteen of the thirty-two recommendations and
statements made since the 2010 ACUS revival deal directly with rulemaking or with issues of particular
importance to rulemaking.” (footnote omitted)).
79. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2018-7, Public Engagement in Rulemaking, 84 Fed.
Reg. 2139, 2146 (Feb. 6, 2019).
80. Id. at 2148 (suggesting early solicitation of information or data through publishing ‘‘requests for
information’’ (RFIs) or ‘‘advance notices of proposed rulemaking’’ (ANPRMs)).
81. Id. (adding that summaries of such efforts and acquired information should also be conveyed to the
public).
82. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2018-6, Improving Access to Regulations.gov’s
Rulemaking Dockets, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2143 (Feb. 6, 2019); Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation
2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269, 76,270 (Dec. 17, 2013); Admin. Conference of the
U.S., Recommendation 2017-3, Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728 (Dec. 29, 2017).
See generally Farina et al., supra note 78 (describing a number of additional ACUS rulemaking
recommendations and assessing their impact on the rulemaking process).
83. Parrillo, supra note 1, at 168 (“[G]uidance can be produced and altered much faster, in higher volume,
and with less accountability than legislative rules can.”).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018).
85. Parrillo, supra note 1, at 168.
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may proceed in its regulatory activities.86 In practice, however, guidance is often
effectively binding because of the phenomenon one of us has labeled “regulation
by compliance.”87 Regulated parties often have strong incentives to comply with
guidance. Those incentives include meeting an agency’s preapproval
requirements, maintaining good relationships with agency overseers, developing
compliance officer positions to assist in compliance beyond legal requirements,
and avoiding risks of one-off agency enforcement.88 Moreover, guidance is
rarely challenged in court due to these incentives.89 And even in the small,
unrepresentative “fraction” of cases bringing guidance to courts, the courts are
likely to apply a deferential standard when assessing the guidance.90
However, guidance is still an important way for agencies to clarify their
regulatory plans and activities. Indeed, it is also a way to bring more
predictability and rule-of-law values to other agency actions, such as the exercise
of enforcement discretion, that are insulated from judicial review. The Trump
Administration has recognized these values and potential dangers, responding
with guidance on guidance. One example is the Justice Department’s “Brand
Memo,” which prohibits agencies from treating guidance documents as de facto
regulations to avoid the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.91 Also, as
noted in Part I.B.2, the President has issued an executive order on guidance that
requires agencies to establish procedures for public petitioning to withdraw or
modify outdated guidance, to make all agency guidance documents available on
their websites, and to follow heightened procedures for “significant” guidance
that include OIRA review and public notice and comment.92
These executive branch declarations generally track ACUS’s
recommendations, which similarly suggest that agencies avoid injecting
guidance with binding intent. For general statements of policy, agencies should
avoid using mandatory language and should expressly state that the public may
86. Id. at 168–69.
87. For a discussion of one example of “regulation by compliance” regarding the issuance of “Dear
Colleague Letters” by the Department of Education, see Walker, supra note 3, at 1626–27. In her contribution
to this Symposium, Ming Hsu Chen explores issues with agency guidance that touches on civil rights and
immigration. Ming Hsu Chen, How Much Procedure Is Needed for Agencies to Change “Novel” Regulatory
Policies?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1127 (2020).
88. See Parrillo, supra note 1, at 184–230 (documenting and assessing the strength of these compliance
incentives).
89. Id. at 171 (stating that “only a tiny and unrepresentative fraction of guidance is likely to end up in
litigation” because of the strong incentives for maintaining healthy agency relationships, especially for highstakes licensing schemes).
90. Id. at 213–14 (citing, inter alia, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). The case Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400 (2019), may narrow the reach of Auer deference. See Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means for
the Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT (June 26, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-of-auer-deferencethe-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine/.
91. Memorandum from Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Heads of Civil Litigating
Components, Limiting Use of Agency Guidance Documents in Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1028756/download.
92. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 15, 2019).
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take other lawful approaches than the one provided in the guidance.93 For
interpretative rules, most of the suggestions for policy statements apply, as well
as additional best practices. For example, agencies should make clear which
agency officials are required to follow the rule and where the public can go
within the agency to modify or seek a waiver from that rule.94 ACUS has also
proposed guidelines for how agencies should internally manage published
guidance documents. This includes posting guidance documents online in a
“well organized, up to date, and easily accessible” manner.95 These various
ACUS proposals seek to magnify the benefits of agency guidance while
minimizing the costs of such subregulatory activity that often escapes
supervision by courts, Congress, or the President.
C.

FORMAL ADJUDICATION

Formal adjudication involves trial-like proceedings before an
administrative law judge or other agency adjudicator, with the final decision
subject to judicial review.96 Despite the availability of judicial review, such
review is both unlikely and ineffective for the vast majority of adjudications.
This is due to at least two factors. First, adjudicated individuals often lack the
resources or wherewithal to appeal adjudications to federal courts.97 This is
particularly true for high-volume agency adjudications that are subject to
massive backlogs of cases that spur quicker, and thus more cursory and
inconsistent, case processing,98 often without legal representation for those
pushed through the process.99 Notable high-volume adjudications include
immigration, Social Security benefits, and veterans’ benefits cases.100
Second, adjudications that are successfully appealed to federal courts may
not be representative of the majority of inconsistent adjudications that are not
appealed. For example, in removal proceedings in immigration courts, only
about three percent of immigrants without lawyers appeal their cases.101 And

93. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2017-5, Agency Guidance Through Policy
Statements, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,736 (Dec. 29, 2017).
94. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2019-1, Agency Guidance Through Interpretive
Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,927, 38,929 (Aug. 8, 2019).
95. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2019-3, Public Availability of Agency Guidance
Documents, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,927, 38,932 (Aug. 8, 2019).
96. See generally Walker & Wasserman, supra note 9, at 148–57 (detailing both the old and new world of
agency adjudication). As noted in supra note 9, this Essay groups together as “formal” adjudication all agency
adjudications where a statute or hearing requires an evidentiary hearing, leaving any other adjudication in the
“informal” adjudication categorization.
97. David Ames et al., Due Process and Mass Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22–
23 (2020).
98. Id. at 9.
99. See id. at 23–24 (referencing the ability of immigration judges to deny continuances that would give
immigrants more time to seek their own counsel and avoid navigating the system without representation, as it is
not required in immigration proceedings).
100. Id. at 9.
101. Hausman, supra note 9, at 1193.
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most appeals arise from cases handled by judges who gave more time to
immigrants to find lawyers.102 Thus, harsher judges “systematically evade
scrutiny” from federal courts, which makes review of most immigration cases
ineffective for resolving inconsistencies in the agency adjudicative system as a
whole.103 As David Ames and coauthors rightly underscore in the mass agency
adjudication context, “[j]udicial review and external oversight are too infrequent
and too abstract to ensure that granular realities of day-to-day decisionmaking
align with legal requirements.”104
ACUS has identified and recommended a number of best practices in
internal law to improve agency adjudication. These include public availability
of practice rules, availability of adjudication materials on agency websites,
establishment of recusal rules for adjudicators, best practices for assisting selfrepresented individuals, and a sweeping suite of procedural protections for
agency hearings.105 These recommendations for improvements in internal
administrative law aim to ensure that adjudicative systems are fairer and lead to
more equitable results—against the backdrop understanding that very few
agency adjudication decisions make it to federal court.
Agency adjudication, moreover, implicates deeper, structural forms of
internal administrative law. As one recent study observed, “[q]uality assurance
initiatives are the epitome of internal administrative law.”106 Adjudication at the
Social Security Administration (SSA), a regular subject of Jerry Mashaw’s
pioneering scholarship on internal administrative law,107 provides a particularly
relevant example. The Social Security Appeals Council is an agency appellate
body that is not a creature of statute, but instead born of regulation, created by
the SSA Commissioner in 1940 as a delegation of final decisionmaking authority
to review adjudicative decisions at the SSA.108 Today, the Appeals Council
consists of nearly 100 administrative appeals judges and appeals officers and

102. Id. at 1197–1205.
103. Id. at 1197.
104. Ames et al., supra note 97, at 29.
105. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2018-5, Public Availability of Adjudication Rules,
84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2142 (Feb. 6, 2019); Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2017-1, Adjudication
Materials on Agency Websites, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,039, 31,039 (July 5, 2017); Admin. Conference of the U.S.,
Recommendation 2018–4, Recusal Rules for Administrative Adjudicators, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2139 (Feb. 6,
2019); Admin. Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2016-6, Self-Represented Parties in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,319 (Dec. 23, 2016); Admin. Conference of the U.S.,
Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed.
Reg. 94,312, 94,314 (Dec. 23, 2016).
106. Ames et al., supra note 97, at 29.
107. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes
on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
108. See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the
Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 231–
55 (1990) (detailing the history, legal basis, and procedures for the Appeals Council).
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hundreds of support personnel, and processes more than 100,000 appeals per
year.109
The creation of an internal agency appellate review system is a form of
internal law for quality control of trial-level agency adjudications. Over the
decades, ACUS has issued a number of reports and recommendations to improve
SSA adjudication, including at the Appeals Council.110 For example, in 2013,
ACUS recommended that the Appeals Council improve its quality control
measures by establishing neutral principles for selecting and reviewing
unappealed decisions and otherwise identifying inconsistencies and other
problems in trial-level adjudication.111 In reviewing the SSA’s efforts, Gerald
Ray and Jeffrey Lubbers conclude that SSA has achieved substantial
improvement in terms of productivity and the quality of adjudicative
decisionmaking.112
When it comes to high-volume agency adjudication, external
administrative law will do little to help most adjudicated individuals. Internal
administrative law is not a cure-all, but when implemented effectively, it can go
a long way toward ensuring consistency and fairness to their agency adjudicative
systems.
D.

INFORMAL ADJUDICATION

Agency actions that do not fit within the categories of rulemaking,
subregulatory guidance, formal adjudication (where a statute or regulation
requires an evidentiary hearing), or enforcement fall under the APA’s residual
category of “informal adjudication.” These actions are diverse and numerous.
They receive varying levels of insulation from judicial review. Many involve
decisions made by frontline agency officials who act in the moment as
“investigator, prosecutor, and judge.”113 One important example is expedited
removal for noncitizens at the border. Jennifer Koh has written extensively about
the dangers of these “shadow removal proceeding[s],”114 in which immigration
officers are able to deny noncitizens entry at the border “without further hearing
or review” by an immigration judge.115 More than four in five removal orders
109. Brief History and Current Information about the Appeals Council, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_ac.html (last visited June 28, 2020). In the 2019 fiscal year, the Appeals
Council processed approximately 144,000 appeals. Id.
110. See, e.g., Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis by
the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of the United States) Is
Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1585–88, 1601–1606
(2015) (detailing the history of ACUS recommendations for SSA adjudication).
111. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2013-1, Improving Consistency in Social Security
Disability Adjudications, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,352, 41,354 (July 10, 2013).
112. Ray & Lubbers, supra note 110, at 1604–07; cf. Ames et al., supra note 97, at 77 (“SSA’s recent efforts
are promising, but its decades of fitful experimentation and the persistent temptation to favor quantity over
quality make rigorous critique by impartial outsiders all the more essential.”).
113. Koh, supra note 10, at 184.
114. Id. at 206.
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018); see also Koh, supra note 10, at 195–96.
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issued in fiscal year 2013 were expedited removals that not only evaded
immigration-court review, but also review in an Article III court.116
Informal adjudication is an unavoidable feature of modern regulatory
governance, as agencies are tasked with adjudicating millions of matters each
year where no statute or regulation requires an evidentiary hearing. But many of
these informal adjudications are even further insulated from judicial review than
their formal, trial-like counterparts. Internal law, therefore, can and should play
a critical safeguarding role. Many of the quality-control tools discussed in Part
II.C, for instance, could be implemented with similar success in the informal
adjudication context.
One additional form of internal law that merits further attention is the use
of agency ombuds, which are part of a broader concept that Margo Schlanger
calls “Offices of Goodness.”117 Offices of Goodness are still dependent internal
parts of the agency, but they hold “value-infused” and “advisory” roles to
monitor agency actions in order to ensure they meet the values underlying
agency policies and statutory directives.118 By wielding “influence and
commitment” to challenge agency action from the inside,119 Offices of Goodness
can provide an important check that may be unavailable to courts for certain
informal adjudications on the outside. Not surprisingly, ACUS has encouraged
agencies to create and strengthen ombuds offices. ACUS finds that internal
ombuds are more likely to provide impartial support to the public while external
ombuds primarily focus on furthering and improving the agency’s own
mission.120
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, provides a model that
may be worth adapting in other agency contexts. The Taxpayer Advocate
Service (TAS), an independent office within the IRS, is an Office of Goodness
with two main, distinct objectives.121 First, the TAS has physical offices in every
state, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, where individual
taxpayers can get free help with tax problems they have with the IRS.122 The
TAS ombuds work with affected taxpayers and the IRS to resolve those issues.
In 2003, for instance, then-National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson reported
that the TAS had around 2200 employees nationwide and had closed a quarter-

116. Koh, supra note 10, at 184; see also § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing an exception for noncitizens who
indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution in his or her origin country, in which case the
immigration officer “shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer”).
117. Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 53, 65 (2014).
118. Id. at 60–62.
119. Id. at 103 (explaining that the dependent and internal nature of Offices of Goodness requires them to
rely on their “influence and commitment” to affect agency actions in furtherance of their assigned values).
120. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-5, The Use of Ombuds in Federal Agencies,
81 Fed. Reg. 94,312, 94,316–17 (Dec. 23, 2016).
121. Who We Are, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/about/who-we-are (last
visited June 28, 2020).
122. Id.
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million cases in the prior year.123 Second, leveraging these tens of thousands of
annual individual interactions nationwide, the TAS recommends systemic
reforms to the federal tax system. As Olson explains, Congress has directed the
TAS to “identify administrative issues that create or contribute to [taxpayers’]
problems as well as legislative provisions that may create these
problems. . . . [and then] make administrative proposals and legislative
recommendations to mitigate the problems we’ve identified.”124 Indeed, the
TAS is statutorily required to submit an annual report to Congress, in which it
“identif[ies] at least 20 of the most serious problems facing taxpayers.”125
We can easily envision the benefits of similar Offices of Goodness
embedded in other high-volume agency adjudicative systems, such as
immigration, veterans’ benefits, or the SSA. To be sure, such Offices of
Goodness may not be possible as creatures of internal administrative law. They
may require statutory creation (and appropriations). But many of the best
practices the TAS has embraced could be adopted piecemeal through
innovations to internal agency practices and procedures.
E.

ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

While agency enforcement actions are subject to judicial review, the initial
agency decision whether to enforce is generally not judicially reviewable. More
specifically, all decisions an agency makes about whether to enforce its policies,
as well as how often to enforce those policies and against whom, are
presumptively left up to the agency’s own prosecutorial discretion.126 Thus, it is
difficult for courts to address either under- or over-enforcement by agencies.
This remains so despite the reality that either decision leads to inevitable harm
of one affected party over another. For under-enforcement, those who would
have benefited from enforcement actions against regulated entities, such as
investors who benefit from SEC audits, now receive less protection of their legal
rights and interests. For over-enforcement, those groups who triggered the
increased enforcement are often disparately regulated when compared to
similarly situated regulated parties who are not so targeted. Such “crackdowns”
have been justified by “a fixed idea that executive power is synonymous with

123. Nina E. Olson, Taxpayer Rights, Customer Service, and Compliance: A Three-Legged Stool, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2003).
124. Id. at 1241.
125. Who We Are, supra note 121; see also Phyllis Horn Epstein, National Taxpayer Advocate: A Champion
for Fairness and Effectiveness, PA. LAW., May–June 2019, at 42, 42–48 (detailing some of the recent
achievements of the TAS).
126. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) (“[T]he presumption that agency decisions not to
institute [enforcement] proceedings are unreviewable . . . .”). See generally Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement
as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571 (2016) (surveying the caselaw that insulates executive
nonenforcement decisions from judicial review and arguing that such judicial nonreviewability doctrine is better
grounded in the political question doctrine).
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the power to choose enforcement targets and to formulate enforcement
policy.”127
Internal administrative law can help fill the judicial void in patrolling
agency exercises of enforcement discretion. Perhaps Offices of Goodness in
particular could assist in checking against arbitrary or capricious enforcement
decisions. As ACUS has recommended in the related context of regulatory
waivers and exemptions, agencies can publish guidance on enforcement
priorities to establish clear criteria and thus encourage consistent application.128
Shoba Wadhia has taken this argument one step further in the immigration
context, advocating that the agency should go through notice-and-comment
rulemaking to more fairly channel prosecutorial discretion in immigration
enforcement, and then establish procedures to make enforcement decisions more
transparent and accountable.129 To be sure, we do not argue for complete
transparency, or even the same level of transparency in every regulatory context.
Too much transparency in some contexts may enable sophisticated regulated
parties to evade compliance with the law. And broad nonenforcement policies
for broad classes of offenders could encroach on legislative powers.130
These examples merely scratch the surface of the variety of internal
administrative laws that could bring more fairness, transparency, accountability,
and process to administrative exercises of enforcement discretion. Much more
work needs to be done. But these examples illustrate that, while more effective
external judicial checks on agency enforcement discretion are unlikely to emerge
anytime soon, the agencies themselves have many tools available to them to
safeguard the regulated against abuse in administrative enforcement activities.
CONCLUSION
In seeking to operationalize internal administrative law as a crucial
bulwark against agency overreach, we do not suggest it is—without more—a
sufficient one. Just like judicial review is important yet inadequate on its own,
so too is internal administrative law. Among other things, agencies retain great
flexibility to ignore or otherwise depart from many internal procedures and
practices when they desire. And even if all agencies faithfully comply, such

127. Sohoni, supra note 12, at 45. Sohoni defines “crackdown” as “an executive decision to intensify the
severity of enforcement of existing regulations or laws as to a selected class of offenders or a selected set of
offenses.” Id. at 33.
128. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2017-7, Regulatory Waivers and Exemptions, 82
Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017); see also Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce
the Law: A Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1545–47 (2018) (suggesting agency
procedures and approaches to address the problems with regulatory waivers).
129. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
IMMIGRATION CASES 85–87 (2015).
130. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 675
(2014) (arguing that executive officials generally “lack discretion to categorically suspend enforcement or
prospectively exclude defendants from the scope of statutory prohibitions,” though they have “discretion to
decline enforcement in particular cases”).
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internal rules cannot offer complete protection against arbitrary or capricious
agency action. We must also further develop other safeguards, such as judicial
review, congressional oversight, presidential review, and public observation and
mobilization.
Yet, as we have illustrated with examples drawn from ACUS and
elsewhere and applied in various regulatory contexts, internal administrative law
has a powerful––and empowering––role to play in disciplining bureaucracy,
especially for agency actions that evade judicial review. As Metzger and Stack
conclude, “[t]he constraints imposed by internal administrative law will be
critical in resisting unlawful or excessive assertions of administrative power
now, just as they have been in the past.”131 We hope this Essay—albeit
exploratory in nature—spurs a more sustained inquiry into internal
administrative law and a deeper appreciation of ACUS’s role in encouraging
federal agencies to innovate within Vermont Yankee’s “white space” of internal
administrative law.132

131. Metzger & Stack, supra note 14, at 1248.
132. Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 15, at 523–24.
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